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NOTES
THE HERSHEY TRUSTS QUEST TO DIVERSIFY:
REDEFINING THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ROLE
WHEN CHARITABLE TRUSTS WISH TO DIVERSIFY
INTRODUCTION
In 2002, the trustees of the Hershey Trust, in an effort to
diversify the trust's holdings, started down the path to sell the
trust's controlling interest in Hershey Foods Corporation. As offers
to buy the controlling interest emerged and the sale came close to
being consummated, the Pennsylvania Attorney General, in his
parens patriae role, sought to block the sale by petitioning a court
to order the trustees of the Hershey Trust to show cause as to why
the sale of the trust's controlling interest in Hershey Foods should
not require court approval.' The Pennsylvania Orphans' Court
granted an injunction halting the sale and the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania later affirmed this injunction. Subsequently,
the trustees agreed to an out-of-court settlement and voted against
selling the Hershey Trust's controlling interest in Hershey Foods.
This Note examines the state attorney general's role in the
supervision of a charitable trust. Specifically, in light of the
Hershey Trust's settlement with the Pennsylvania Attorney
General agreeing not to sell its controlling share in Hershey Foods
Corporation, this Note argues that the power of the attorney
general should be limited when (1) a trustee has discretionary
power to make investments as expressed in the trust document, and
1. For relevant background material on recent developments concerning the Hershey
Trust, see generally In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
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(2) a trustee, in good faith and without breaching any fiduciary
duties, uses this discretionary power to diversify the charitable
trust's investments.
Part I of this Note examines the legal doctrine of charitable
trusts, how they are formed, what their purposes may be, and what
fiduciary duties apply to their trustees. Part I also sets forth the
framework of a trustee's duty to diversify the charitable trust assets
under the Prudent Investor Rule and Pennsylvania's adoption of
that rule.2 Part II discusses the historical underpinnings of the
attorney general's parens patriae role in supervising charities as
well as the attorney general's current function. Part III of this Note
analyzes the actual language of the original trust document to
discuss the formation of the Hershey Trust and the powers granted
to its trustees. Part III also describes the circumstances surround-
ing the recent settlement of the Hershey Trust with the Attorney
General, and includes a description of Pennsylvania's rather
stringent legislative response to the Hershey Trust's actions. Part
IV offers recommendations for placing limits on an attorney
general's action by outlining the procedure that an attorney general
should follow when faced with situations similar to the Hershey
Trust's quest to diversify.
I. CHARITABLE TRUSTS
A. Background
Charities, particularly in the form of charitable trusts and
charitable foundations, play a significant role in meeting the needs
of many Americans. Due to this significance, it is helpful for
purposes of this Note to explain how charitable trusts came to be
recognized legally in this country.
Charitable trusts formed in the United States today trace their
legality back to early English common law. Historically, the laws
pertaining to charities, and more specifically, charitable trusts,
were embodied in the law of trusts that the English Courts of
2. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7201, official cmt. (West 1999).
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Chancery developed.' A significant law that the English enacted
was the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601, which sought to
establish an efficient enforcement scheme to protect against the
mismanagement of charities and their funds and "guid[ed] for
centuries the development of the charitable trust."4 As people left
England for the New World, early colonial settlers continued the
English tradition of private charity in the American colonies.5
After the Revolutionary War, the framers of the U.S. Constitution
did not specifically enumerate charitable institutions as one of the
powers of the federal government.6 As such, most charities "are
chartered under the auspices of a state."7 Many states passed laws
that supported charities.' For example, a 1776 draft of Pennsylva-
nia's Constitution stated that "all religious societies or bodies of
men heretofore united or incorporated for the advancement of ...
other pious and charitable purposes, shall be encouraged and
protected in the enjoyment of the privileges, immunities and estates
which they were accustomed to enjoy ... under the laws and former
constitution of this state."9 Although many states after the Revolu-
tionary War supported charities through legislation, some states,
which specifically repealed all English statutes, no longer supported
charities because they wished to rid themselves of any vestiges of
English sovereignty.'0
In 1819, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the legality of
charitable trusts in Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v.
3. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 82 (1965).
4. JAMES C. BAUGHMAN, TRUSTEES, TRUSTEESHIP, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: ISSUES OF
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HOSPITALS, MUSEUMS, UNIvERSITIEs, AND LIBRARIES 4 (1987) (noting
that the Statute of Charitable Uses is also referred to as the Statute of Elizabeth). "The
English Tudor rulers, especially Elizabeth I, hated and feared poverty and vagabondage
because they unsettled the whole society." Id. See also EDITH L. FISCH ETAL., CHARITIES AND
CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 17 (1974) (discussing the passage of the Statute of Charitable
Uses).
5. FISCH ET AL., supra note 4, at 20; see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 36
(discussing how charitable trusts flourished in Colonial America due to English law's
encouragement of philanthropy, churches' teaching of charity, and colonists' needs).
6. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 5.
7. Id. (noting, however, that the U.S. government has established the American Red
Cross).
8. See FISCH ET AL., supra note 4, at 20; FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 36.
9. FISCH ETAL., supra note 4, at 21 (quoting PA. CONST. OF 1776 § 45).
10. Id.; see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 37 (citing Virginia as an example).
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Hart's Executors. 1 In Hart's Executors, a case involving a charitable
trust in Virginia, the Court ruled that the legality of charitable
trusts originated from the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601 and,
because Virginia repealed all English statutes, the particular
charitable trust at issue failed legally.'2
In Vidal v. Girard's Executors, decided in 1844, the Supreme
Court reversed itself and held that courts should recognize charita-
ble trusts in America despite state statutes that abolished English
law.13 In deciding Vidal, the Court recognized that it erroneously
had concluded in Hart's Executors that trusts without specific
beneficiaries did not exist under English common law before the
time of the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601.'
Charitable trusts and charitable foundations became an impor-
tant part of American history and the American social landscape. 5
Throughout the history of the United States, many noteworthy
industrialists and business leaders who amassed enormous fortunes
established charitable trusts and foundations to bestow some of
their wealth on those less fortunate. In the first half of the twenti-
eth century, several notable charitable trusts and foundations
originated, carrying the names with the likes of "Russell Sage,
Phelps-Stokes, Rosenwald, Duke, Guggenheim, Kellogg, Mellon,"
Ford, 6 and Hershey. In recent times, Bill Gates, founder of
Microsoft Corporation, has taken up the torch of his predecessors
11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819).
12. Id. In Hart's Executors, Chief Justice Marshall opined that charitable trusts derived
their legality from the Statute of Charitable Uses, not from any preceding English common
law. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND
TRUSTS 710 (rev. ed. 2000).
13. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844). In deciding Vidal, the Court concluded that charitable
trusts did not derive their legality from the Statute of Charitable Uses, but instead were part
of English common law. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 12, at 710.
14. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 37-38.
15. See generally Thomas Parrish, The Foundation: 'A Special American Institution," in
THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 7 (Fritz F. Heimann ed., 1973). Other particular appeals of
charities are their ability to experiment and incubate innovation: "The American public
accepts (independent nonprofit organizations] perhaps based on the assumption that the
independent nonprofit sector not only alleviates some of the burdens of government but also
is free to experiment with new and creative ideas and programs that would not be as easy,
or even possible, otherwise." BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 3.
16. Parrish, supra note 15, at 15-16.
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by using his vast wealth for charitable purposes with the formation
of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
17
One of the most influential persons in the history of American
charities was Andrew Carnegie, who, in 1889, set forth his "gospel
of wealth."" Carnegie defined a millionaire as a "trustee for the
poor, [entrusted] for a season with a great part of the increased
wealth of the community, but administering it for the community
far better than it could or would have done for itself."9 The driving
idea behind Carnegie's vision was giving people the means to
"realize their potential."20
Charities play a meaningful part in American society, notably in
the form of "orchestras, professional associations, civic groups,
social-service organizations, and religious groups ... [as well as] ...
museums, colleges and universities, hospitals, and libraries."21
B. Legal Doctrine
Although now vested with an understanding of the legal roots of
charitable trusts in the United States as well as the vision behind
their establishment, it is also important for purposes of this Note's
analysis to present a brief discussion of the legal doctrine behind
charitable trusts. This section discusses how and for what purposes
one forms a charitable trust.
The Second Restatement of Trusts defines a charitable trust as
"a fiduciary relationship with respect to property arising as a result
17. See httpJ/www.gatesfoundation.org (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
18. Parrish, supra note 15, at 14 (noting also that Carnegie had once said that "it is
disgraceful to die a rich man").
19. Id. (noting that Carnegie believed that communities should have "universities,
libraries, hospitals, medical schools, parks, swimming [pools]").
20. Id. at 15. James Baughman has aptly described"America's charitable enterprise" by
quoting the words of John D. Rockefeller, III:
Government alone cannot solve our massive and complex problems. We need
the input of the private sector-the input of individual initiative which has been
the great strength of this country from the beginning. We are a pluralistic
society. Philanthropy is a means, not an end in itself. It provides funds to make
individual initiative effective, in other words to make the private nonprofit
sector an effective supplement to governmental effort.
BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 1 (quoting JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, III, THE NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATION HANDBOOK (1980)).
21. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 1.
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of a manifestation of an intention to create it, and subjecting the
person by whom the property is held to equitable duties to deal with
the property for a charitable purpose."22 Usually, a charitable trust
arises by an inter vivos or testamentary transfer of property.23
Necessarily, a charitable trust must have a settlor who intended to
create such a trust, delivery of property that will be the trust's
subject matter, a charitable purpose, and indefinite beneficiaries.24
A charitable trust is not valid until the settlor surrenders legal title
to the property creating the trust.' Unless otherwise provided in
the document creating the trust, a charitable trust may continue
indefinitely.26
According to the Second Restatement's definition, a charitable
trust must be formed for a charitable purpose. 7 Such permissible
purposes include: relieving poverty, advancing education, advancing
religion, promoting health, advancing a government or municipal
aim, and any other purposes that benefit a community.' A purpose
of a charitable trust, however, cannot contravene public policy or
effectuate committing a crime or tort.29
C. Charitable Trusts Under Pennsylvania Law
Pennsylvania has enacted laws defining charitable trusts that
are similar to those embodied in the Restatements. Like other
jurisdictions, Pennsylvania requires that the beneficiaries of a
charitable trust be indefinite in nature; that is, "[the beneficiary of
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959).
23. FISCH ETAL.,supra note 4, at 173-74 (indicating, however, that a charitable trust may
also arise by constructive trust); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 349 (1959)
(listing the ways in which a charitable trust may be created).
24. FISCH ETAL., supra note 4, at 174.
25. Id. at 179.
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 365 (1959).
27. See id. § 348.
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001). A purpose is
charitable if it is of "such social interest or benefit to the community as to justify permitting
the property to be devoted to the purpose in perpetuity and to justify the various other
special privileges that are typically allowed to charitable trusts." Id. § 28 cmt. a.
29. FISCH ET AL., supra note 4, at 240.
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charitable trusts is the general public to whom the social and
economic advantages of the trusts accrue." 0
Pennsylvania courts have the authority to provide relief if a
trustee or representative acts beyond the scope of the trust. In
Pennsylvania, a "court ... may restrain a personal representative
from making any sale under an authority not given by the governing
instrument or from carrying out any contract of sale made by him
under an authority not so given."3 To summarize, "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by the trust instrument, the trustee, for any
purpose of administration or distribution, may sell, at public or
private sale, any real or personal property of the trust."32 A trustee,
however, may not be held liable for a breach of his duty unless that
breach caused a loss.
33
D. The Trustee's Fiduciary Duties
A trustee's duties arise from two different origins: the terms
stated in the trust document and legally established fiduciary
duties.34 Most notably, trustees have fiduciary duties of obedience,
care, and loyalty.35 Although the duty to diversify is a subsection of
the duty of care, this Note will examine that fiduciary duty
separately. 6
30. Estate of Pruner, 136 A.2d 107,109 (Pa. 1957); see also SCOTTONTRUsTS § 391 (2001)
(stating that in the case of charitable trusts, the beneficial interest is not given to an
individual but rather to the public).
31. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3355 (West 2002) (emphasis added).
32. Id. § 7141.
33. In re McCune, 705 A.2d 861, 865 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (noting that a party bringing
an action against a trustee "cannot be legitimately aggrieved, unless that party has suffered
a loss").
34. FREMONT-SMrrH, supra note 3, at 91.
35. Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of
Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CoRP. L. 655, 661 (1998) (noting the 'Trinity" of fiduciary
duties trustees must consider).
36. See discussion infra Part I.D.4.
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1. Duty of Obedience
In accordance with the duty of obedience, trustees have the duty
to preserve the purpose of a charitable trust.37 The trustees are
limited in their actions by both the law pertaining to charities and
the "specific purpose provisions in the charity's organizational
documents or the terms of the particular gifts." 38 With regard to
breaching the duty of obedience, "[any attempt to take action
contrary to the settlors' directions may be deemed to constitute a
unilateral and invalid deviation from the trust terms even though
the trustee is otherwise given broad discretions in administering
the trust."39 A trustee, consequently, must pay close attention to a
settlor's instructions before deciding upon a course of action.
2. Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty prohibits trustees of a charitable trust from
profiting personally at the expense of the charity they apparently
serve.4 Trustees may not allow the property of the charitable trust
to be used for purposes that are noncharitable.4' Furthermore,
trustees may not employ methods of "favoritism" or direct their
actions to benefit third parties or other interests.42 To adhere to the
duty of loyalty, a trustee should not put himself into "a position that
would make it difficult for him to be honest and faithful to his
duties, or where his self interest would be antagonistic to the
interests of the organization to which he owes duties. 3
Most famously, Judge Cardozo described a trustee's duty of
loyalty in these terms: "A trustee is held to something stricter than
37. Atkinson, supra note 35, at 661.
38. Id.
39. GEORGE BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs § 541, at 161-62 (rev. 2d ed.
1993).
40. Atkinson, supra note 35, at 661.
41. FISCHETAL.,supra note 4, at 391.
42. Id. at 392.
43. Id. (citation omitted); see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 94 (noting that "[a]
trustee's interest must always yield to that of the beneficiary").
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the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior."
4 4
3. Duty of Care
Regarding the duty of care, the trustees have the duty to manage
properly the assets of a charitable trust." Moreover, if the trustee
has a specialized skill, he must use that skill.'6 If the trustee acts
diligently and with good faith, then the trustee will not be held
personally liable for a bad decision.' 7 Accordingly, the duty of care
protects against a trustee wasting or misapplying the trust assets.
4. Duty To Diversify
The key fiduciary duty for purposes of this Note's analysis is the
duty to diversify. The duty to diversify actually falls under the
larger umbrella of the duty of care, which commands a trustee of a
charitable trust to manage properly the trust assets.' In order to
manage its assets properly, a trustee must preserve the value of
those assets. 9 This duty to preserve value may be accomplished
through diversifying the trust's asset portfolio according to modern
financial techniques. Stated simply, a trustee's duty to diversify is
prescribed by common sense-it is "not prudent to keep too many
eggs in one basket."0
The Third Restatement of Trusts articulates the Prudent
Investor Rule, the standard by which trustees are judged with
respect to their investment and diversification decisions." The
Prudent Investor Rule both extends and clarifies the older and
outdated Prudent Man Rule,52 the latter requiring a trustee to act
44. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 547 (N.Y. 1928).
45. Atkinson, supra note 35, at 661.
46. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 98.
47. FISCH ETAL., supra note 4, at 396.
48. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
49. Estate of Pew, 655 A.2d 521, 542 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
50. FREMONT-SMiTH, supra note 3, at 100 (indicating that whether to diversify is
especially pertinent to charitable trusts that received a significant portion of stock from the
same corporation).
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUsTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 (1992).
52. Id. § 227 cmt. a.
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in a prudent and cautious fashion with the overriding purpose to
preserve the trust's principal.5 3 In particular, the Prudent Investor
Rule sets forth that the "trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries
to invest and manage the funds of the trust as a prudent investor
would, in light of the purposes, terms, distribution requirements,
and other circumstances of the trust."' According to the Prudent
Investor Rule, this duty to diversify should be "applied to invest-
ments not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio."
5 5
Furthermore, in investment decisions, the trustee has a duty to
diversify the trust's investments, except in certain limited circum-
stances when it would not be prudent to do so. 56 Most importantly
for purposes of this Note, whether a trustee is in breach with
respect to this duty depends on the "prudence of the trustee's
conduct, not on the eventual results of the investment decisions."57
Accordingly, process-not outcome-should dictate any liability for a
breach of duty to diversify. Taking this principle one step further,
examination of the process-not outcome-should guide any author-
ity's action to halt the attempt of a trustee to abide by the duty to
diversify.58
A particular question regarding whether to diversify arises with
a trust's original investments, which are also known as "inception
assets."59 Whether a trustee should retain or sell the trust's original
investments-that is, investments given to the trust at its forma-
tion-may properly depend on the "property's special relationship to
some objective of the settlor that may be inferred from the circum-
53. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 481 (5th ed. 1998) (indicating that
the assumption behind the Prudent Man Rule is that "trust beneficiaries are highly risk
averse and therefore prefer to receive a lower expected return in exchange for taking fewer
risks"). A settlor, however, who wants the trustees to make risky investments, may provide
for this desire in the trust instrument through the use of express language evidencing that
desire. Id. at 482. One main difference between the Prudent Man Rule and the Prudent
Investor Rule is that the Prudent Man Rule requires the trustees to examine each individual
investment and applies that standard to each investment, not the portfolio as a whole as does
the Prudent Investor Rule. See id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR
RULE § 227 (1992).
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 (1992).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 227 cmt. b (emphasis added).
58. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 229 cmt. a (1992).
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stances." ° This special relationship does not need to be stated
expressly in the trust instrument.61 The commentators to the Third
Restatement's Prudent Investor Rule indicated that shares repre-
senting control or influence in a publicly held or closely held
corporation are examples of such special property. 62 An example in
the Third Restatement, however, describes a situation where the
settlor granted to the trust a considerable portion of shares in a
single company and, absent any evidence that the settlor wanted
the trustees to keep these shares, the trustees are under a duty to
diversify such investments by selling a sizeable portion of those
shares." Absent such special purpose for retaining the property or
any other evidence requiring such retention, the trustee thus should
be free to abide by his duty to diversify.
In Pennsylvania, the Prudent Investor Rule has been adopted. 4
Shortly after the Hershey Trust settlement the Pennsylvania
legislature amended this rule.65 This section, however, will examine
Pennsylvania's Prudent Investor Rule in its pre-amendment state.
Under Pennsylvania law, the duty to reasonably diversify does not
apply to trusts that already had existed at the time the legislature
had adopted the Prudent Investor Rule.6 Particularly, before
adopting this rule, Pennsylvania had never required trustees to
diversify the trust assets and if this rule were made retroactive,
then "drafters of old trusts [would have] to have been clairvoyant to
have negated a non-existent duty to diversify." 7 Because Milton
Hershey formed the Hershey Trust before Pennsylvania adopted
the Prudent Investor Rule," the trustees of the Hershey Trust are
under no strict duty to diversify. Nevertheless, the trustees of the
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. § 229 cmt. d, illus. 1.
64. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7201, official cmt. (West 1999) (indicating, however, that
certain sections of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, notably sections 4 through 7 and 12,
were not adopted).
65. See discussion infra Part III.C.
66. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7204, official cmt. (West 1999).
67. Id.
68. See infra note 122 and accompanying text (noting the date of inception for the
Hershey Trust).
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Hershey Trust may always use sound business judgment in
following the Prudent Investor Rule and decide to diversify.
Under Pennsylvania law, trustees must "exercise reasonable
care, skill and caution in making and implementing investment and
management decisions."69 Pertinent to this Note, however, once
again process factors more importantly than outcome. The Pennsyl-
vania legislature adopted the Prudent Investor Rule "[as] standards
of conduct and not of outcome or performance." 0 Specifically, to
determine compliance with those rules, one must look to the facts
and circumstances present at the time of the trustee's decision.71 A
trustee "is not liable to the extent the [trustee] acted in substantial
compliance with the[se] rules ... or in reasonable reliance on the
terms and provisions of the governing instrument."72
A trustee, under Pennsylvania law, may retain the assets that
the trust received at its inception, despite the fact that these assets
may comprise a "disproportionately large share of the portfolio."73
It is important to point out that this statute permits, rather than
mandates, a trustee to retain the trust's inception assets. In doing
so, a trustee may consider the "asset's special relationship or special
value, if any, to the purposes of the trust or to one or more of the
beneficiaries" when making investment decisions.74
The IRS has also weighed in on a charitable foundation's holding
of large portions of a corporation's stock.75 Section 4943 of the
Internal Revenue Code defines "[elxcess business holdings" of a
foundation as "an interest in the stock of any given corporation that
exceeds a specified percentage of the corporation's outstanding
shares."" A special excise tax is imposed on foundations that hold
such an interest in order to "discourage the use of nonprofit
foundations as a device for controlling the governance of a for-profit
69. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7212 (West 1999) (indicating that if a trustee has special
investment skills, he or she must use those skills).
70. Id. § 7213 (emphasis added).
71. Id. (noting that the trustee's decision should not be considered in hindsight).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 7205.
74. Id. § 7203(cX6) (amended 2002).
75. See I.R.C. § 4943 (2000), cited in Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 455 (Del. 1991).
76. Oberly, 592 A.2d at 455.
1780 [Vol. 45:1769
THE HERSHEY TRUST
corporation." 7 The Internal Revenue Code "includes penalties for
investments that 'jeopardize' an organization's charitable mission,
such as putting too much money into a single stock."7 1 Conse-
quently, the Internal Revenue Code also frowns upon trustees who
put too many eggs in one basket.
Ultimately, a trustee's duty to diversify is a duty not to be taken
lightly. The underlying rationale behind the duty to diversify is
preservation of the value of the trust assets. Usually, it takes
money in order for a charitable trust to achieve its stated purpose.
Those charitable trusts with trustees that are adept at preserving
(and indeed growing) the assets of the trust will flourish, not fail.
It is easy to confuse, however, the principle of preserving trust
value with the notion of preserving initial property granted to the
trust. This Note argues that these two ideas are distinct and that
preserving value, not preserving property, should be a trustee's
utmost concern.
II. PARENs PATRIAE: DEFINING THE STATE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S ROLE
A. Historical Foundation
Attorneys general have long played an important role in the
oversight of charitable trusts. A state attorney general's authority
to enforce charitable trusts originated with English common law.79
The enforcement powers of the attorney general precede the
enactment of the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601.80 Professor
Austin Wakeman Scott, an authority on the law of trusts, explained
77. Id. (citing Tax Reform Act of 1969, H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 27-31 (1969), reprinted
in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1671-75).
78. Shelly Branch et al., Sweet Deal: Hershey Foods Is Considering a Plan To Put Itself
Up for Sale, WALL ST. J., July 25,2002, at Al (indicating that the IRS rarely follows through
on such suits).
79. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 26; COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL, THE NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE REGULATION OF CHARITABLE
TRUSTS AND SOLICITATIONS 3 (1977) [hereinafter STATE REGULATION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS].
The chancery courts, in the early fifteenth century, used their equitable jurisdiction to
enforce charitable uses, which were the precursors of current trusts. The attorney general
intermittently brought such actions for enforcement on behalf of the Crown. Id.
80. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 26.
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the historical underpinnings of an attorney general's enforcement
power:
In England the records show that even before the enactment of
the Statute of Charitable Uses in 1601 suits were brought by the
Attorney-General to enforce charitable trusts. The community
[had] an interest in the enforcement of such trusts and the
Attorney General represent[ed] the community in seeing that
the trusts [were] properly performed.81
Attorneys general in Colonial America wielded broad powers that
had their roots in English common law. 2 The term "parenspatriae"
describes an attorney general's role in the "public supervision of
charitable property." 3 In England, "[tihe termparenspatriae ... was
used ... to refer to the monarch's duty to protect property devoted to
charitable uses, although that duty was executed by the attorney
general who represented the Crown." 4 In the United States, the
term "parens patriae refers to the people of the state. Following the
English tradition, the attorney general represents the interests of
the state in enforcing charitable funds."' Generally, parens patriae
powers of state attorneys general were firmly entrenched by the
latter part of the nineteenth century8 6 and may be summarized with
the following:
As the common law devolved on the states and federal govern-
ment, the attorney general came to represent the state and its
interests in charities. [The attorney general] holds a prerogative
right not only to protect but also to enforce all charities, as well
as to represent interests of the community at large. These are
the ancient powers of guardianship over persons under disabil-
ity and of protectorship of the public interest in charities.87
81. AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 391 (1967).
82. STATE REGULATION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 79, at 3.
83. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 27.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. STATE REGULATION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 79, at 3 (citing several state
court cases that in particular upheld the attorney general'sparenspatriae powers regarding
charities). Parenspatriae translates into "parent of his country" and refers to "the duty of the
sovereign to protect both the public interest and those with disabilities." BARRON'S LAW
DIcTIONARY 360 (4th ed. 1996).
87. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 27.
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B. Standing To Sue and Enforcement of Charitable Trusts
In order to understand the role of the state attorney general in
the enforcement and oversight of charitable trusts, it is useful to
discuss the concept of standing and how standing is limited in the
realm of charitable trusts. To bring a suit against another party,
the complaining party must have standing to sue."8 A helpful way
to explain the concept of standing in the area of charitable trusts is
to compare who may sue charitable trusts with who may sue
private trusts. In a private trust with named beneficiaries, those
beneficiaries have standing to sue and "can compel the trustee to
carry out the terms of the trust and to administer the trust in
accordance with fiduciary standards." 9
Unlike private trusts, with charitable trusts, no party "whose
interest is only that held in common with other members of the
public" may bring an action against a charitable trust, unless a
statute grants the authority to sue." A member of the general
public, therefore, does not have standing to sue a charitable trust.
Because a member of the general public benefits from a charitable
trust but cannot bring suit against such a trust, the government
allows state attorneys general to supervise charities and to compel
their legal responsibilities.91 Courts view state attorneys general as
the proper parties to initiate a suit to enforce fiduciary duties that
charities have towards the public.2 In being a necessary party as
such, "[t]he attorney general must typically be made a party to any
88. The concept of standing derives from the cases and controversy requirement
embedded in the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. In the case of Allen v.
Wright, the Supreme Court articulated the three constitutional elements of standing: (1) the
plaintiff must allege a distinct personal injury, either an actual or imminent, non-
speculative, injury; (2) a plaintiff can trace the injury to the defendant's actions; and (3) a
court's favorable decision could offer redress to the plaintiff. 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
89. SCOLES ETAL., supra note 12, at 605.
90. Wiegand v. Barnes Found., 97 A.2d 81,82 (Pa. 1953); see also BAUGHMAN, supra note
4, at 26.
91. Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV.
37,38 (1993); see also SCOLESETAL.,supra note 12, at 740 ("Suit to enforce a charitable trust
is brought by or in the name of the attorney general, or, in a few states, by some local official
such as the county attorney. This power of the attorney general exists even in the absence
of a statute so providing.").
92. Blasko et al., supra note 91, at 38.
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action brought by another person or organization to enforce,
construe, modify, or determine the validity of a charitable trust."
93
An attorney general's parenspatriae power over charitable trusts
is usually denoted as the power of enforcement,94 which implies "the
duty to oversee the activities of the fiduciary who is charged with
management of the funds, as well as the right to bring to the
attention of the court any abuses which may need correction."95 This
duty, however, does not entail a "right to regulate, or a right to
direct either the day-to-day affairs of the charity or the action of the
court."9" In other words, an attorney general does not have the
authority to act as co-trustee of a charitable trust.
Attorney general enforcement and oversight of charitable trusts
is indeed less than perfect:
Attorney general enforcement is problematic on a practical level
for several reasons. Given the current budgetary constraints
facing almost all state governments, the effectiveness of
attorney general enforcement is likely to be sporadic, at best.
Lack of money, coupled with the obligation to discharge the
other important duties of the attorney general's office, contrib-
utes to inadequate staffing for the purpose of supervising
charities. This often results in a necessarily selective prosecu-
tion of only the most egregious of abuses.'
Consequently, the means to enforce and monitor charitable trusts
are often inadequate.9
93. SCOLES ETAL., supra note 12, at 740.
94. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 198.
95. Id.
96. Id.; see also In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324, 337 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2002) (Pellegrini, J., dissenting) (observing that an attorney general does not have the power
"to essentially act as co-trustee or co-manager").
97. Blasko et al., supra note 91, at 38-39 (citation omitted); see also SCOLES ETAL., supra
note 12, at 741 (arguing that "busy attorneys general and their staffs do not always
satisfactorily discharge their general obligations concerning charitable trusts, nor do they
always respond to legitimate pleas for action on the part of interested citizens").
98. SCOLES ETAL., supra note 12, at 741 (discussing that some states have enacted some
form of legislation to try to address and alleviate such shortcomings in the process by which
charitable trusts are supervised).
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C. Pennsylvania Law Defining the Attorney General's Authority
The state of Pennsylvania follows similar procedures to those
discussed in the preceding section of this Note. In Pennsylvania,
charitable trusts are "initially and continuously subject to the
parens patriae power of the Commonwealth and the supervisory
jurisdiction of its courts."99 Because the public is the real benefi-
ciary of a charitable trust, the attorney general must be made a
party in a proceeding affecting a charitable trust in order to
represent properly the public's interest.100 According to the rules of
the Pennsylvania Orphans' Court, the attorney general must be
given notice of any pending proceeding. l Furthermore, an attorney
general has the authority "to inquire into the status, activities and
functioning of public charities."'o2 In this regard, the Pennsylvania
Attorney General has standing to bring suit against the trustees of
a charitable trust.
D. Acting Beyond Parens Patriae: Pushing a Political Agenda
Attorneys general, however, must factor in scarce resources and
budget constraints in deciding how many cases they will pursue
against abuses in charitable trusts and, therefore, will select only
certain cases to prosecute. 0 3 Because they must factor available
resources in deciding whether to challenge an action of a charitable
99. In re Estate of Coleman, 317 A.2d 631,634 (Pa. 1974). The attorney general has been
called "an integral arm of the sovereign." Cain Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C.3d 50, 57 (C.P. Ct.
Delaware County 1980). Furthermore, parens patriae powers "permitted the sovereign,
wherever necessary, to see to the proper establishment of charities through his officer, the
attorney general, and to exercise supervisory jurisdiction over all charitable trusts." Id. at
59 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *427).
100. Estate of Pruner, 136 A.2d 107, 110 (Pa. 1957) (indicating that the proceeding may
be one of "invalidation, administration, termination or enforcement"). A member of the public
that a charitable trust benefits is barred from enforcing a duty of that trust because this rule
protects the trustees from widespread suits predicated on little investigation. Valley Forge
Historical Soc'y v. Washington Mem'l Chapel, 426 A.2d 1123, 1128 (Pa. 1981).
101. PA. ORPHANS' CT. R. 5.5 (West 2002) (noting that "no notice to the Attorney General
or his designated deputy shall be required with respect to a pecuniary legacy to a charity in
the amount of $25,000 or less which has been or will be paid in full").
102. Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 500, 505 (Pa. 1960) (affirming the
common law principle that the attorney general is a necessary party in litigation involving
charitable trusts).
103. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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trust, attorneys general may consider which cases could advance
their careers. The political leanings and ambitions of an attorney
general, therefore, may factor into deciding which cases he plans to
pursue and which cases he permits to slip through unchallenged.
Several examples of pushing such political agendas have been
publicized. One notable example centers on the so-called right to die
in the case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.0 4
Mark Tushnet argued that in Cruzan, the Missouri Attorney
General wished to advance his own political agenda by sacrificing
the patient's interests when he took the position that "human life
is always sacred" to win the favor of the state's pro-life
constituents.10 5 One thing, in particular, pointed to the fact that the
Missouri Attorney General used this case to obtain political
favor-"after winning the Cruzan case, the attorney general
withdrew from later trial court proceedings. Missouri thereby
enable [d] Cruzan's family to disconnect her from the machines that
were prolonging her existence. " '
Abortion, like the right to die in the previous example, is another
hotly contested issue that many voters recognize and deem
important. A South Carolina attorney general was also accused of
pushing his own anti-abortion political agenda instead of fighting
for the protections of women's health when he called for enforce-
ment of more stringent regulations even though physicians in South
Carolina fought for an injunction blocking those regulations from
becoming effective.107
Finally, possible layoffs and plant closings always catch the
attention of voters, especially if they or their loved ones may be
affected. At the time of the Hershey Trust ordeal,' the Pennsylva-
nia Attorney General was running for Governor of Pennsylvania as
104. See generally 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
105. Mark Tushnet, A Goldilocks Account of Judicial Review?, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 63, 70
(2002) (quoting CHRISTOPHERL. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 59 (2001)).
106. Id. (questioning if "Missouri really cared about Nancy Cruzan's life, why would its
attorney general permit her medical treatment to end after her legal battle left the public
limelight?").
107. Mandee Silverman, RU-486: A Dramatic New Choice or Forum for Continued
Abortion Controversy?, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY OFAM. L. 247, 281-82 (2000).
108. See discussion infra Part III.
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the Republican nominee.109 In a campaign advertisement, the
attorney general "claim[ed] [that] he saved 6,000 midstate jobs by
stopping the sale of Hershey Foods Corp." 10 It is not too much of a
stretch to infer that the Pennsylvania Attorney General selected to
pursue the Hershey Trust situation at least in part to gain some
political capital with the Pennsylvania voters.
Ironically, a member of the Pennsylvania Attorney General's
office had approached the Hershey Trust to stress the importance
of diversifying its assets.' Even when a member of the trust asked
the person from the Attorney General's office about the effect of a
sale on the Hershey community, the staffer allegedly replied that
the Hershey Trust had a fiduciary duty to the Milton S. Hershey
School and that the community could not be its "sole concern.""'
Understandably, one Hershey Trust insider went so far as to accuse
the attorney general of "start [ing] the fire so he could be the one to
put it out" and using the case as a political platform."'
E. Arguments Against Limiting the Attorney General's Role
Several arguments against limiting the role of the state
attorney general with regards to enforcement of charitable trusts
may be asserted. One argument is that the government would act
ineffectively if it permitted entities to call themselves charitable
trusts without commanding them to yield to any inspection or
supervision."' Put more concretely, "[floundations should not only
operate in a goldfish bowl, they should operate with glass
pockets.""5
109. See Peter L. DeCoursey, FisherAd Seizes on Hershey Sale Halt; GOP Hopeful Claims
He Saved 6,000 Jobs, HARRISBURG PATRIOT NEWS, Sept. 26, 2002, at B1 (Mike Fisher, the
Pennsylvania Attorney General, subsequently lost the gubernatorial election).
110. Id. (indicating, however, that the advertisement conveniently left out the fact that
the Attorney General's staff had previously recommended to the Hershey Trust the need to
diversify its holdings).
111. Sarah Ellison, Sale of Hershey Foods Runs Into Opposition, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26,
2002, at A3 (discussing a December 2001 meeting between an attorney general staffer and
the Hershey Trust board where the attorney general staffer suggested diversification of
assets or even an outright sale of the trust's Hershey Foods stockholdings).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 500, 505 (Pa. 1960).
115. Id. at 505 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2514, 82d Cong.).
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Another argument regards the aspect of indefinite beneficiaries
in a charitable trust as contrasted to definite shareholders in a for-
profit corporation." 6 Unlike a charitable trust, the corporate form
lessens agency costs because corporations have definite owners and
definite objectives to make profits. 117 Charitable trusts lack definite
ownership, so beneficiaries are often unable or disinclined to
monitor the actions of the trustees.1 ' The attorney general,
therefore, necessarily monitors charitable trusts to ensure actions
of the trustees are in line with the trust's goals." 9
This Note, however, does not argue for removing the state
attorney general from his role in overseeing and enforcing charita-
ble trusts. Indeed, due to the indefinite nature of charitable trusts'
beneficiaries and the substantial legal costs that could be foisted
onto charitable trusts if such beneficiaries were permitted to sue,
this Note argues that the attorney general should remain a
necessary party to any suits brought against charitable trusts. This
Note argues instead that an attorney general should refrain from
bringing unnecessary suits against trustees of charitable trusts,
especially in efforts to diversify.
III. THE HERSHEY TRUST
A. Formation of the Hershey Trust
For nearly a century, the Hershey Trust has touched the lives of
many residents of Hershey, Pennsylvania, and the surrounding
communities. By deed of trust, Milton S. Hershey and his wife
Catherine endowed an institution known as the Milton Hershey
School to benefit orphan children. 20 The deed of trust instructed
that the Milton Hershey School be located in Derry Township,
Pennsylvania, and gave preference to children residing in certain
Pennsylvania counties.' 2' Specifically, the deed detailed "the
116. See generally Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable
Organizations, 1999 WIs. L. REV. 227.
117. Id. at 227.
118. Id. at 227-28.
119. See id. at 228-29.
120. In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324, 328 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
121. Id. at 328-29 (noting also that Milton Hershey established a community known as
Hershey near his chocolate factory that included 'banks, a department store, community
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purpose of creating and endowing in perpetuity a Foundation for
educational purposes to be known as The M.S. Hershey Founda-
tion. '""'2 Mr. Hershey transferred "five thousand (5000) shares of
the common stock of the Hershey Chocolate Corporation" at the
time of the deed."2 Presently, the Hershey Trust assets contain
shares that amount to a controlling interest in the Hershey Foods
Corporation.
12 4
The deed of trust grants the trustees discretion in making
investment decisions by stating:
The funds of the principle of the trust estate and the unex-
pended income of the property held in trust not immediately
needed for the purposes of the trust shall be invested and the
trustee at all times by and with the authority and approval of
the Managers shall have full power and authority to invest all
or any part thereof in any securities which the Trustee and the
Managers together may consider safe, whether the said securi-
ties or any of them are legal investments for trust funds or not,
and neither the Trustee nor the Managers shall be held account-
able, for the exercise of its and their discretion, exercised in good
faith, as to the character of the investments which may be made
by the authority and approval of both."
The deed further grants the trustees the power to sell its invest-
ments by stating: "The Trustee shall have power to sell any
securities at any time held by it, but no sale of securities nor
investments of any kind shall at any time be made by the Trustee,
without the authority and approval of the Managers. 126 The deed,
therefore, does not expressly mandate that the trustees or manag-
ers of the M.S. Hershey Foundation must keep the shares of
center, hotel, sports facilities, theatre, hospital, utility companies, transportation, and homes
for himself and for many of his employees").
122. Hershey Foundation Deed (Dec. 5, 1935) (on file with author).
123. Id.
124. In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d at 329. On a quick side note, Hershey
Foods Corporation manufactures Hershey's, Reese's, and Jolly Rancher candies. See Profile
of Hershey Foods Corporation, at www.hersheys.comfabout/profile.shtml (last visited Jan.
28, 2004).
125. Hershey Foundation Deed (Dec. 5, 1935).
126. Id.
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Hershey Foods."' Rather, the deed of trust grants the trustees the
powers to make investments and dispose of such investments
through a sale.
B. Recent Developments: The Hershey Trust's Quest To Diversify
In 2002, the Pennsylvania Attorney General petitioned the court
to have the Hershey Trust show cause as to why the sale of its
controlling interest in Hershey Foods should not require court
approval. 128 The Hershey Trust maintained that its aim in selling
the controlling share of Hershey Foods was to "diversify its portfolio
of assets in the School Trust.""2 The Pennsylvania Attorney
General, however, sought to compel the court to enjoin the Hershey
Trust from selling its controlling share in Hershey Foods at least
until a hearing could be held on approving any proposed sale.13
0
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania stated that "the
Attorney General has the authority to inquire whether an exercise
of a trustee's power, even if authorized under the trust instrument,
is inimical to the public interest."'3' The Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania concluded that a merger or acquisition of Hershey
Foods most likely would lead to reduced workforces and possible
changes in plant locations.
132
The court held that the Pennsylvania Attorney General met his
burden of proving "the potential harm that he seeks to prevent,
namely, the adverse economic and social impact against the public
interest if a sale of Hershey Foods Corporation takes place,
particularly in its effect of the Corporation and the community of
Derry Township."'
33
127. See id.
128. See In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d at 325. The Hershey Trust holds 31%
of Hershey Foods' common stock as well as 77% of the voting stock. Sarah Ellison, Hershey
Foods' Controlling Trust Says It Has "No Intentions to Sell," WALL ST. J., Sept. 27,2002, at
B5.
129. In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d at 329.
130. Id. at 328.
131. Id. at 330.
132. Id. at 329. This statement, however, was mere speculation as the court offered no
concrete evidence to support it. See id.
133. Id. at 331.
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The court's reasoning is faulty. The attorney general's role as
parens patriae over charitable trusts is to protect the public as
beneficiary of the trust against wrongful actions by the trustees.'3
In the Hershey Trust's case, the trustees' actions in wanting to sell
the controlling interest in Hershey Foods did not harm the public
as beneficiaries of the trust. Rather, at most, the sale of Hershey
Foods harms the public as other constituencies (as workers,
customers, suppliers) of Hershey Foods, not the Hershey Trust."3 '
The stated purpose of the Hershey Trust is to fund schooling for
underprivileged children residing in certain Pennsylvania
counties, 13 6 not for the protection of job security for workers
employed at Hershey Foods.
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's ruling extends the role
of the Pennsylvania Attorney General too far. The Commonwealth
Court allowed the attorney general to act beyond his parens patriae
authority. The court's ruling sanctioned the attorney general's
political agenda and his aims at vote-getting in central Pennsylva-
nia. In particular, the Pennsylvania Attorney General challenged
a legitimate charitable trust action seemingly to push forth his own
political career because he was running for governor of Pennsylva-
nia at the same time he tried to stop the Hershey Trust's diversifi-
cation efforts.'37
Attorneys general could view numerous legitimate actions as
being "inimical to the public interest," especially in election years.
An oversimplified hypothetical is useful to demonstrate this point:
Consider a charitable trust that has the sole stated purpose to
provide funding to artists residing in community X. Community X,
unfortunately, is inhabited by many people, all of whom would like
to receive funding but only a few of whom are actual artists or
appreciate looking at art. This situation could be viewed as
"inimical to the public interest" if the public is defined as all of
those non-artists living in communityX. One should glean from this
134. See generally Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 500 (Pa. 1960).
135. But cf STATE REGULATION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 79, at 5 ("It is a widely
accepted principle that the public is the ultimate or true beneficiary of charitable trusts.
Direct beneficiaries are the conduits through which the public receives the benefits of
charity,).
136. See Hershey Foundation Deed (Dec. 5, 1935) (on file with author).
137. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text (discussing the Attorney General's
gubernatorial campaign and Hershey-specific campaign advertisement).
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example that the attorneys general and the courts should not
broadly define the public that a charitable trust serves, but rather
should define it narrowly in accordance with the trust's stated
purpose or the settlor's intent.
C. The Pennsylvania Legislature's Response
The Pennsylvania legislature recently responded to the Hershey
Trust situation by amending Pennsylvania's Prudent Investor
Rule.' With what could be deemed only a special interest amend
138. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7203 (West 2002) (amending 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
7203 (West 1999)). Pennsylvania's amended Prudent Investor Rule states in relevant part:
(d) Requirements for charitable trusts holding a controlling interest in certain
publicly traded business corporations.-
(1) Notwithstanding any other legal requirement or process which may
include court review of the activities of a charitable trust, a fiduciary for
a charitable trust with beneficiaries at a principal location within this
Commonwealth holding a controlling interest in a publicly traded business
corporation received as an asset from the settlor shall not consummate any
investment or management decision executing a change in the trust's
control of that corporation, by sale, merger, consolidation or otherwise, without:
(i) serving notice upon the Attorney General at least 60 days
prior to executing the change in control; and
(ii) directing that at least 30 days' prior notice of the execution
of the change in control be provided by the corporation to
employees of the publicly traded business corporation held by
the trust who are located in this Commonwealth.
(2) In addition to any other power or duty provided by law, the Attorney
General also has the power to obtain judicial review pursuant to this
subsection if the Attorney General concludes that the fiduciary should be
prevented from executing such a change in control.
(3) In obtaining judicial approval under this subsection, the fiduciary must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that executing the change in the
trust's control of the corporation is necessary to maintain the economic
viability of the corporation and prevent a significant diminution of trust
assets or to avoid an impairment of the charitable purpose of the trust.
(4) In the event court approval is obtained pursuant to this subsection, the
court shall ensure that the provisions of 15 Pa.C.S. Ch. 25 Subchs. I
(relating to severance compensation for employees terminated following
certain control-share acquisitions) and J (relating to business combination
transactions - labor contracts) apply to the execution of a change in the
trust's control effectuated by the fiduciary of a charitable trust with
beneficiaries at a principal location within this Commonwealth holding a
controlling interest in a publicly traded business corporation received as
an asset from the settlor.
(5) A fiduciary of a charitable trust with beneficiaries at a principal
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ment, the legislature granted the attorney general power to order
a judicial review if the attorney general believes that the trustees
should be stopped from effectuating a change in control of a publicly
traded corporation in which a charitable trust holds a controlling
share."3 9 When the attorney general obtains this judicial review,
then the trustee of such a charitable trust "must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that executing the change in the trust's control
of the corporation is necessary to maintain the economic viability of
the corporation and prevent a significant diminution of trust assets
or to avoid an impairment of the charitable purpose of the trust.""°
This amendment to Pennsylvania's Prudent Investor Rule
unnecessarily stifles efficient economic transactions. By creating
such a high burden of proof-clear and convincing-that the trustees
must meet before such a proposed sale could go forward, the
Pennsylvania legislature effectively made it more costly for a
charitable trust like the Hershey Trust to diversify. Substantially
more time and resources would have to be spent from the outset on
such things as lawyers, accountants, and financial experts. These
additional costs may dissuade trustees from ever acting to diversify.
The Pennsylvania legislature turned the attorney general's role of
parenspatriae in relation to charitable trusts from one of protecting
the state to one of protecting certain special interests. This Note
urges other states to avoid following the example Pennsylvania put
forth in enacting this amendment.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS ON REDEFINING THE STATE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S ROLE
Although this Note does not propose to curtail completely the
state attorney general's role in overseeing the diversification efforts
location within this Commonwealth holding a controlling interest in a
publicly traded business corporation received as an asset from the settlor
shall not be subject to liability for the commercially reasonable sale of
certain shares of the corporation not necessary to maintain control and for
which no control premium is realized if the fiduciary reasonably
determined that such sale was authorized in a manner consistent with the
requirements of this section and other applicable provisions of this title.
Id. § 7203(d) (footnotes omitted).
139. See id. § 7203(dX2).
140. Id. § 7203(dX3) (West 2002).
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of charitable trusts, it proposes a specific procedure that state
attorneys general should follow before bringing a potentially
unnecessary action to enjoin such efforts to the courts. The state
attorney general should be restricted from acting to halt the sale of
a charitable trust's investments when: (1) the charitable trust
document specifically provides that the trustees have discretion in
investing the trust assets, (2) the trustees of the charitable trust
wish to fulfill their duty to diversify the trust assets and have acted
in a manner consistent with the manner in which a prudent
investor would act, and (3) upon examining the process by which
the trustees attempt to diversify the trust assets, the attorney
general is satisfied that the trustees have acted in such a way as to
be protected by something analogous to the business judgment rule.
Consistent with the factors described above, the attorney general
also should examine whether the trustees' actions to diversify have
combatted the settlor's expressed intent in forming the charitable
trust.
A. Determining General Investment Powers or Restrictions
When faced with trustees of a charitable trust that want to
diversify its trust assets, a state attorney general should first
examine the trust instrument to determine the settlor's intent as to
the trustees' investment power. If a settlor enumerates which types
of investments may or may not be made and a trustee breaches
those express provisions, then an attorney general should enjoin the
trustee from making those restricted investments. An attorney
general acting in such a situation rightfully protects the intent of
the settlor. If, however, the settlor grants discretion to a trustee to
make investments to sustain the trust, then an attorney general
should give deference to a trustee's actions as long as the trustee
meets the prudent investor standard.""
If such investments are sanctioned by the trust instrument, the
attorney general should not interfere with a trustee's investment
decisions or otherwise the attorney general effectively would go
141. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 (1992).
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beyond the scope of his parens patriae power and instead act as a
co-trustee of the trust.
142
In the case of the Hershey Trust, this is exactly what the
Pennsylvania Attorney General accomplished. No express provision
in the trust existed that restricted the trustees from selling the
Hershey Trust's controlling share of Hershey Foods.14 Rather, the
trustees acted within the discretion that Mr. Hershey had granted
them in the trust instrument. 144
B. Determining Restrictions on Sale of Inception Assets
14
1. Express Restrictions
A trustee's decision to retain or to sell the trust's original
investments-those given to the trust at its beginning-may depend
on the "property's special relationship to some objective of the
settlor that may be inferred from the circumstances." 14' The most
evident circumstance occurs when the trust instrument specifically
states a restriction on selling the inception assets. This would make
for an easy case for the attorney general-absent some other legal
theory permitting the sale of those assets, the attorney general
should seek to enjoin the trustees' attempt to diversify by disposing
of such assets.
To illustrate the legal effect of such express restrictions, it is
helpful to compare the situation present in Commonwealth v.
Barnes Foundation"7 to that of the Hershey Trust. In Barnes
142. See, e.g., In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324,337 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)
(Pellegrini, J., dissenting) (indicating that the Attorney General lacks power "to essentially
act as co-trustee or co-manager of the Trust and be part of the process leading up to a
decision by the Trustees to take a certain action"); see also supra notes 95-96 and
accompanying text.
143. See Hershey Foundation Deed (Dec. 5, 1935) (on file with author).
144. See id.
145. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 229 cmt. a (1992). That
special relationship does not need to be stated expressly in the trust instrument. Id.
Arguably, no implied intent existed on the part of Mr. Hershey to restrict the sale of the
Hershey stock. This may be inferred from the fact that Mr. Hershey set up this trust to
provide educational benefits to poor children, not to provide complete well-being to the entire
Hershey community.
147. 159 A.2d 500 (Pa. 1960).
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Foundation, the Attorney General charged the trustees with failing
to meet the mandates of their governing trust instrument. 148 The
Barnes Foundation is a charitable foundation that holds the art
collection amassed by Dr. Albert Barnes and serves as an art
education center. 149 In contrast to the Hershey Trust instrument,
the Barnes Foundation indenture "outlined a severely limited
investment policy for the Foundation's endowment. The Indenture
strictly forbade charging entrance fees to the collection, the
construction of new buildings on the Foundation's premises, and the
loan or sale of any of the paintings under any circumstances short
of physical deterioration."50
The instrument forming the Hershey Trust, on the other hand,
did not restrict the sale of the inception assets-the Hershey
common stock-like the Barnes Foundation indenture did with the
inception assets of the artwork collection. No language existed in
the Hershey Trust instruments to warrant the Attorney General's
conclusion that the trustees failed to meet the mandates of the trust
instrument.
Instead, the instrument defining the Hershey Trust gave the
trustees discretion to make investments and did not mandate that
the trustees hold on to the Hershey shares granted to the trust at
its inception. 5 ' Ultimately, in the case of the Hershey Trust, the
Pennsylvania Attorney General was unable to point to any specific
trust language that the trustees breached but rather could only
amorphously allege that the trustees' actions harmed the public as
beneficiaries. 152 Such baseless allegations, while perhaps helping to
148. Id. at 505 (stating that the trustee defendants denied public access to an art gallery
as mandated in the trust). In other Pennsylvania cases that were examined, the Attorney
General usually made a specific allegation that the trustee failed to execute a provision in
the trust instrument or failed to use the trust assets to achieve the purpose that the settlor
intended. See, e.g., Valley Forge Historical Soc'y v. Washington Mem'l Chapel, 426 A.2d 1123
(Pa. 1981); Abel v. Girard Trust, 365 Pa. 34 (1950); In re McCune, 705 A.2d 861 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1997); Cain Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C.3d 50 (C.P. Ct. Delaware County 1980).
149. Chris Abbinante, Comment, Protecting "Donor Intent" in Charitable Foundations:
Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes Foundation, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 670-71 (1997).
150. Id. at 672 (citations omitted). The Barnes Foundation is a good example of when
preserving the value of the trust assets also equals preserving the value of the property
granted to the trust (namely, the artwork). See supra Part I.D.4.
151. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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further the Attorney General's political career, only frustrated the
intent of the settlor.
2. Implied Restrictions
Even in the absence of an attorney general finding express
language of a trust that restricts a trustee from making investment
decisions in general 53 or in particular with the trust's inception
assets,5 4 the attorney general should still look at whether the sale
of the assets is "inimical to the public good" because this sale would
be inimical to the charitable purpose of the trust. Determining
whether a sale of assets would be inimical to the trust's charitable
purpose should be defined narrowly. If attorneys general have wide
latitude to determine whether a trustee's investment actions are
inimical to the public, then the risk arises of having the attorneys
general use that power for their own political motivations.'
Accordingly, the attorney general should not look at the identity
of the investment at all. Instead, the attorney general should focus
on the use of the income from the trust assets. A simple example
may help clarify how Hershey common stock does not serve a
special purpose to the trust, like artwork, a farm, or a particular
building would serve another trust. To reiterate, the Hershey
Trust's purpose is to provide schooling for underprivileged children,
with preferences given to children residing in certain counties in
Pennsylvania.' Initially to fund that purpose, Mr. Hershey
granted common stock shares in Hershey Foods.5 7 These fungible
shares serve no special purpose to the trust.
To illustrate, a share of stock in Corporation ABC that is worth
$100 and pays annual dividends of $5 has the same purchasing
power as a share of stock in Corporation XYZ that is also worth
$100 and pays annual dividends of $5. Both of ABC's and XYZ's
shares may serve the purpose of paying expenses of running a
school for underprivileged children. In contrast, if a settlor, like Dr.
Barnes, grants his artwork collection for the purpose of showing
153. See supra Part W.A.
154. See supra Part W.B.1.
155. See supra Part II.D.
156. Hershey Foundation Deed (Dec. 5, 1935) (on file with author).
157. Id.
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this collection to the public, then those inception assets serve a
special purpose to the beneficiaries and the trustees' decision to sell
the artwork would contravene the settlor's intent.
C. Examining the Diversification Process: Analogy to the Business
Judgment Rule
If the state attorney general has not found any restrictions on
investments and particularly any restrictions on sales of inception
assets, then the next step the attorney general should undertake is
to investigate the specific process the trustees used or plan to use
to diversify the trust assets. In this step, something analogous to
the business judgment rule should guide the attorney general's
inquiries. In the corporate law realm, the business judgment rule
provides protection for corporate directors from unwarranted
intrusion by disgruntled shareholders. 5 ' The business judgment
rule operates as follows:
If the directors are entitled to the protection of the [business
judgment] rule, then the courts should not interfere with or
second-guess their decisions. If the directors are not entitled to
the protection of the rule, then the courts scrutinize the decision
as to its intrinsic fairness to the corporation and the corpora-
tion's minority shareholders. The rule is a rebuttable presump-
tion that directors are better equipped than the courts to make
business judgments and that the directors acted without self-
dealing or personal interest and exercised reasonable diligence
and acted with good faith.159
In corporate settings, the Pennsylvania legislature defined that
a director of a corporation has a duty of care to "perform his duties
as a director... in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to
be in the best interests of the corporation and with such care,
including reasonable inquiry, skill and diligence, as a person of
ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances."160
158. Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 238, 257 (M.D. Pa. 1987)
(quoting Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 685 (E.D. Pa. 1985)).
159. Gries Sports Enters., Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496 N.E.2d 959,963-64
(Ohio 1986).
160. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 512(a) (West 2002).
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A state attorney general may use something analogous to the
business judgment rule as guidance in deciding whether to call for
injunctive relief or judicial review of a trustee's proposed diversifi-
cation efforts. In order for the attorney general to examine the
process by which the trustees of a charitable trust wish to diversify,
the attorney general must make sure that the decisions the trustees
made were in good faith and absent any wrongdoing.
Specifically, an attorney general may satisfy himself that the
trustees acted in good faith in making their decision to diversify by
examining whether the trustees sought legal advice, obtained a
fairness opinion from a financial expert as to the value of the trust's
investments, negotiated with potential buyers, and, in a situation
like the Hershey Trust where the investment constitutes a control-
ling block of stock, whether the trustees shopped this control block
around to potential buyers in order to receive the best price.
If the attorney general is satisfied that the trustees acted in good
faith and absent any wrongdoing, then this analogy to the business
judgment rule will apply to the actions undertaken by the trustees
and will protect the trustees from any judicial review of their
actions. If the attorney general finds that the trustees indeed acted
in bad faith and with a corrupt motive, then the attorney general
may press forward and demand a judicial review of the trustees'
actions to diversify.
The duty of care that underlies the business judgment rule
presumption in corporate settings has two aspects: procedural due
care and substantive due care. 16 1 Procedural due care only permits
judges to determine whether directors are protected by the business
judgment rule by examining whether "the process employed was
either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance
corporate interests."162 In contrast, "a breach of substantive due
care occurs when a challenged action, viewed ex post, seems so
outrageous or inherently risky that it is simply impossible to
imagine how the directors could have reached that decision other
than as a result of lack of due care or skill."16 3
161. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 966-70 (Del. Ch.
1996).
162. Id. at 967.
163. CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BuSINEss ASSOCIATIONS 317 (3d ed. 1999); see also Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del.
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An attorney general should concentrate his efforts on examining
the process by which the trustees made their decisions. An attorney
general, however, when faced with a decision that was so "outra-
geous" should also be able to bring suit against the trustees despite
whether the process used passed the attorney general's investiga-
tions." 4
D. Refraining from Action
If the process by which the trustees of a charitable trust plan to
diversify the trust assets is protected by something analogous to the
business judgment rule, then an attorney general should not be able
to appeal to the possible outcomes of sale of the controlling shares,
such as possible layoffs due to merger, plant closings that would
reduce state tax revenue base, and so forth. This does not and
should not matter. 1
6 5
The attorney general, under the guise of his parens patriae
powers, cannot mandate that a charitable trust holding a control-
ling block in a company such as Hershey Foods consider other
constituencies in the decision to sell its shares. 166 In Pennsylvania,
the board of directors of a corporation may consider constituencies
other than its shareholders in its decision to sell the corporation. 1
6 7
1988) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that stock repurchase was so egregious that it should
not be protected by the business judgment rule); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 697-99
(Sup. Ct. 1940) (holding that the actions of a bank's directors, which included the purchase
of securities that benefitted only the seller and not the bank, were violative of substantive
due care).
164. A criticism of substantive due care is that it "would expose directors to substantive
second guessing by ill-equipped judges or juries, which would, in the long run, be injurious
to investor interests." In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. The same criticism applies to this
Note's proposal to allow the attorney general to opt for a substantive due care challenge to
the outcome of the trustees' actions. Yet this option will not permit the attorney general to
challenge just any poor outcome. Instead, the attorney general would have to show that the
outcome was "so outrageous or inherently risky." See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note
163, at 317.
165. Although the author of this Note understands the effects of layoffs on workers and
the effects of plant closings on the local community, markets have the best ability to allocate
resources efficiently.
166. Cf 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 515 (West 2002). This statute permits, rather than
mandates, a corporation's board of directors to consider constituents other than shareholders
in a major decision affecting the corporation. See id.
167. Id. The statute states in relevant part:
In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of directors,
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Borrowing from this corporate law other constituencies statute, the
attorney general-in using his parens patriae powers-should not
be able to mandate that the trustees of a charitable corporation
consider other constituencies (like employees, customers, suppliers,
the community) of the company in which it holds shares when
deciding to diversify by selling those shares.
E. Counterarguments and Alternative Solutions
One may argue that this Note's proposal to confine the attorney
general to looking only at whether the process by which trustees of
a charitable trust try to diversify is valid and thus affords the
trustees protection under something analogous to the business
judgment rule is unworkable. This argument would focus on the
attorney general's role of protecting the public against breaches of
duties by trustees and the increased costs to monitor charitable
trusts as compared to corporations.'68
Likewise, one may suggest that a settlor of a charitable trust may
avoid imposing such obstacles on the trustees of a charitable trust
by setting up the trust with an already diversified portfolio. In this
way, the settlor will take the attorney general out of the picture
with regards to questioning the trustees' diversification efforts
because the trust will not hold a controlling share of a publicly
traded corporation at its inception. In situations such as the
Hershey Trust, where legislation such as Pennsylvania's Prudent
Investor Rule affects the decisions of charitable trusts already
established, this solution will not be viable.
Another possible solution is that legislatures could extend
standing to other parties with a special interest in the charitable
trust, such as shareholders of the corporation in which the charita-
committees of the board and individual directors of a domestic corporation may,
in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider to the extent they
deem appropriate:
(1) The effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by such action,
including shareholders, members, employees, suppliers, customers and
creditors of the corporation, and upon communities in which offices or
other establishments of the corporation are located.
Id. § 515(a)(1) (emphasis added).
168. See generally Manne, supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing agency costs
involved in the oversight of charities).
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ble trust owns a controlling share. This still would be a fairly
unviable solution because a corporation's shareholders are often
numerous, thus increasing the potential for a trust to face much
litigation. Moreover, the shareholders would seek to protect their
interests in the corporation, even though those interests may not
necessarily be aligned with the interests of the charitable trust.
CONCLUSION
An attorney general's power to effectuate a politically charged
outcome must be limited in those instances in which trustees of a
charitable trust want to diversify the trust assets, pursuant to an
express provision of the trust document allowing investment
discretion. An attorney general should not block that diversification
effort just because some indirect form of public harm potentially
may occur. If allowed to do so, the attorney general would have
exceeded his parens patriae powers and assumed the role of a co-
trustee. 169 Instead, the attorney general should focus his investiga-
tory efforts to make sure that (1) the trust instrument granted
investment discretion to the trustees, and (2) the trustees, in their
process of diversifying the trust assets, fulfilled their fiduciary
duties in such a way that they would be protected by something
analogous to the business judgment rule. By ensuring that the
trustees have met those factors, the attorney general would not
have exceeded the scope of his parens patriae power.
Jennifer L. Komoroski
169. See supra notes 95-96, 142 and accompanying text.
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